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CROSS-CULTURAL READINGS OF INTENT: FORM, 
FICTION, AND REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS 
Deborah Waire Post 
In her article, Reasonable Expectations in Sociocultural Context, 
Professor Nancy Kim tackles the problems created by an objective 
theory of contract in a pluralistic society and a global economy.  She 
is a proponent of an “expanded intent analysis,” which she says 
would require courts to consider facts “in cultural context.”1  Her 
test for contractual intent, which she has named “contextual 
purposive intent,” would include the social identities of the parties 
to the contract.2  I have chosen to focus on her analysis of Kim v. 
Son,3 an unpublished California appellate court decision in which 
the plaintiff’s claim was denied for lack of consideration, and her 
argument that a contextual purposive intent analysis would have 
changed the outcome and produced a more just result in that case. 
I.  THEORIZING CULTURE IN CONTRACT 
Professor Kim places contract theory in a sociocultural context.  
An examination of culture and law is multifaceted, operating on 
various levels and in multiple sites.  There is the cultural context 
that is present in a particular dispute, the ideological and cultural 
content of contract theory, as well as the culture and institutional 
norms that are internalized by the judiciary. 
While there is an emerging consensus that cultural competence 
is a skill and ethical obligation of practitioners, it is much harder to 
find articles promoting a judicial ethic of cultural competence.4  The 
 
  Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, Touro Law Center, co-author with 
Amy Kastley and Nancy Ota of Contracting Law, a contracts casebook. 
 1. Nancy S. Kim, Reasonable Expectations in Sociocultural Context, 45 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 641, 659 (2010). 
 2. Id. at  643–44. 
 3. No. G039818, 2009 WL 597232 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 9, 2009). 
 4. See, e.g., Sylvia E. Stevens, Cultural Competency: Is There an Ethical 
Duty?, 69 OR. ST. B. BULL., Jan. 2009, at 9, 9–10 (discussing three justifications 
for cultural competency including competitive advantage, access to justice, and 
access to legal services).  Using the Oregon Rules of Professional Conduct, 
Stevens finds this ethical obligation in the duty to provide competent 
representation, the duty to pursue the client’s objectives, and the duty to 
communicate.  Id.  See also Susan Bryant, The Five Habits: Building Cross-
Cultural Competence in Lawyers, 8 CLINICAL L. REV. 33 (2001) (explaining that 
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ethical identity of judges is deeply rooted in a value system and 
ideology that creates social distance between the members of the 
bench and those who appear before them.  For judges, objectivity 
and neutrality are core values associated with the ideals of fairness 
and justice.  Critical scholars have condemned “colorblind” 
jurisprudence as “pluralistic ignorance” that masquerades as 
neutrality and perpetuates structures of subordination and 
oppression.5  There is not much evidence that the judiciary has 
taken this criticism to heart except, perhaps, in a very limited and 
sometimes misguided way in criminal cases.6 
The relevance of culture to contract has been explored by 
relational scholars,7 but that does not mean that there is a general 
recognition among judges or practitioners of the way their 
perceptions and judgments about contract are rooted in a particular 
belief system or worldview.  An objective test for reasonableness in 
contract may be presumed to be hegemonic—the imposition of a 
meaning derived from the cultural lexicon of the dominant group in 
 
cultural competence is considered a skill that can and must be taught to law 
students as well as part of the ethical and professional identity of lawyers); 
Katherine Frink-Hamlett, The Case for Cultural Competency, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 25, 
2011, http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/PubArticleNY.jsp?id=1202491042907 
&slreturn=1 (arguing that cultural competency can have a significant impact on 
legal services and should thus be incorporated into law school curricula); Amy 
Timmer & John Berry, The ABA’s Excellent and Inevitable Journey to 
Incorporating Professionalism in Law School Accreditation Standards, 20 PROF. 
LAW., no. 1, 2010, at 1, 17–19 (proposing that law schools can and should foster 
an environment which teaches cultural competency). 
 5. See, e.g., Neil Gotanda, A Critique of “Our Constitution is Colorblind,” 
44 STAN. L REV. 1, 2–3 (1991); Dwight L. Greene, Justice Scalia and Tonto, 
Judicial Pluralistic Ignorance, and the Myth of Colorless Individualism in 
Bostick v. Florida, 67 TUL. L. REV. 1979, 1980–81 (1993). 
 6. Pluralistic ignorance has been used in two ways in legal scholarship.  I 
am referring to the use made by critical race scholars who describe pluralistic 
ignorance as the “erroneous cognitive beliefs shared by one group regarding 
other individuals or groups.”  Greene, supra note 5, at 1981 n.4.  More precisely, 
it is ignorance of the particular facts, the lived experience of subordinated 
communities, which can or should be used to judge the reasonableness of the 
interpretations, choices, and judgments made by members of that community.  
See id.  Pluralistic ignorance is used by law and economics scholars in 
discussions of norms and their influence on human behavior.  “Under conditions 
of pluralistic ignorance, normative influence leads to the entrenchment of 
suboptimal, as opposed to welfare-enhancing behaviors.”  Alex Geisinger, Are 
Norms Efficient? Pluralistic Ignorance, Heuristics, and the Use of Norms as 
Private Regulation, 57 ALA. L. REV. 1, 16 (2005). 
 7. For a discussion of the work of Macneil and Macaulay, see generally 
Menachem Mautner, Contract, Culture, Compulsion, or: What is So Problematic 
in the Application of Objective Standards in Contract Law?, 3 THEORETICAL 
INQUIRIES IN L. 545, 547 (2002) (“[C]ulture was brought to the center stage of the 
contract process by Stewart Macaulay and Ian Macneil.”). 
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society.  Unless the judge is that “wise Latina,”8 or one whose 
cultural identity has predisposed him to cultural sensitivity, it is 
unlikely that a judge will measure the reasonable expectations of 
the parties to a contract by any other standard.  The acculturative 
effects of participation in legal institutions like law school, law 
firms, bar associations, and the judiciary suggest that identity is not 
always a reliable indicator of cross-cultural or multicultural 
competence.9  In contract disputes, the commitment to objectivity on 
the part of the judiciary may be even more deeply ingrained.  This 
commitment is tied to market ideology, a belief that individual 
agency in bargaining and market exchange is preserved by judicial 
restraint and the use of formal rules. 
Contract law has been theorized as an internally inconsistent 
body of law because it embraces rules that vindicate both an 
individualist and a collectivist ethos.10  Enforcement of subjective 
expectations and desires seems more consistent with a commitment 
to individual liberty, while a reasonableness or collectivist standard 
is believed to limit individual freedom. 
This dichotomy in contract law theory between an individualist 
and a collectivist approach is, of course, inherently misleading.  
Contract law is about relationships and whenever a contractual 
relationship ends in a dispute, resolution by a court of law limits the 
freedom of one or both parties.  Contract has been theorized as a 
liberty because the role of the state is made to seem attenuated, 
enforcing only the duties created by the parties under circumstances 
 
 8. Professor Kim refers to the skirmish over the article Justice Sotomayor 
wrote in which she referred to the importance of her identity and her 
expectation and hope that this would make her a “wise Latina” judge.  Justice 
Sotomayor brings a different perspective to the Court not only because her life 
history is different, but also because of her identity as a Latina and her 
exposure to beliefs, ideals, and values rooted in the experiences of a community, 
not just her experiences as an individual.  While news media faithfully reported 
the public relations releases that portrayed Justice Sotomayor as a woman 
whose success was an “American story,” Republican legislators suggested that 
her gender and her ethnicity meant that she would be “biased.”  Kim, supra 
note 1, at 650–51. 
 9. There have been some attempts to determine whether identity affects 
the decisions of judges.  The common assumption is that it does, or at least that 
is the argument of those who argue for diversity on the bench and in the bar.  
See generally Greene, supra note 5.  One should be careful about using identity 
as a predictor.  For instance, Professor Kim criticizes the decision of Judge 
Marsha Ternus in In re Marriage of Witten because the two biological parents 
were treated the same even though the woman’s investment or contribution to 
the creation of the preembryos and her inability to procreate if she remarried 
meant that she and her ex-husband were in very different positions.  Kim, 
supra note 1, at 660–68. 
 10. Jay M. Feinman, Critical Approaches to Contract Law, 30 UCLA L. REV. 
829, 830, 838–39 (1983). 
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which signal assent to legal enforcement.11  The rules of contract 
law are not concerned with the vindication of one individual’s desire 
or freedom, but address the freedom of all the parties to the 
agreement.  If more than one person is involved, some means must 
be devised to determine the meaning both parties assigned to 
various communicative acts.  The element of intersubjectivity 
removes the agreement beyond the realm of the individual.12 
Professor Kim seeks to replace the objective theory of contract, 
as it is presently understood, with one that considers the social and 
cultural identity of the disputants.  She argues that an objective test 
“erroneously replaces the parties’ intent with a reasonableness 
standard.”13  I agree with Professor Kim that a reasonable person 
test is coercive when the perceptions and the expectations of the 
parties to a contract are analyzed in the abstract.  The reasonable 
person test should be an acknowledgement of community—the 
human connections that support and constrain individual choice and 
agency.  For that reason, Contracting Law, the casebook I co-
authored with Amy Kastely and Nancy Ota, presents the 
“reasonable person” standard methodologically as a continuum that 
ranges from the most abstract conception of reasonableness to one 
which is local and particular, a “situated reasonableness” test.14  A 
contextual purposive intent test or a situated reasonableness test is 
not abandonment, but redefinition, of the reasonable person test.  A 
reasonable person test may even have liberatory potential when 
“community” is defined appropriately. 
Hegemony in contract law is most often expressed in universal 
principles that are justified in terms of powerful sentiments like 
freedom and liberty.  The legal realists and critical scholars, 
however, have argued that freedom is not enhanced and liberty 
interests are not protected when the legitimate expectations are 
defeated.15  Those who argue for a situated reasonableness approach 
 
 11. “[T]he law views private individuals as possessing a power to effect, 
within certain limits, changes in their legal relations. . . . When a court enforces 
a promise it is merely arming with legal sanction a rule or lex previously 
established by the party himself.”  Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 
COLUM. L. REV. 799, 806 (1941). 
 12. Intersubjectivity is defined as “involving or occurring between separate 
conscious minds.”  Merriam Webster, MERRIAM WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE 
DICTIONARY 613 (10th ed. 1996). 
 13. Kim, supra note 1, at 644. 
 14. See generally AMY KASTELY, DEBORAH POST & NANCY OTA, CONTRACTING 
LAW (4th ed. 2006). 
 15. One phrasing of that argument: 
That portion of the field of law that is classified and described as the
law of contracts attempts the realization of reasonable expectations 
that have been induced by the making of a 
promise. . . . Reasonableness is no more absolute in character than is 
justice or morality.  Like them it is an expression of the customs and 
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to intent, or a contextual purposive test for intent, as Professor Kim 
has expressed it, are advocating for an approach that recognizes the 
relationship between the individual and the collective.  Professor 
Kim is asking whether the measure of reasonableness in Kim v. Son 
involved facts that were not in evidence because the Korean identity 
of the two parties was ignored.  The objective test in this case should 
reference the beliefs and expectations of members of the Korean or 
Korean American community. 
II.  CULTURAL COMPETENCE AND THE BURDEN OF PROOF 
Advocates for “cultural competence” or for the eradication of 
“pluralistic ignorance” in the administration of justice in the United 
States will find in Kim v. Son a deafening silence.  There was no 
meaningful discussion of the shared identity of the disputants as 
Koreans.  The identity of the parties was revealed in the facts of the 
case, but was not acknowledged in the application of the law or in 
the discussion of the doctrines or rules of law that determine the 
outcome. 
In the context of Kim v. Son, we might ask who bears the 
responsibility for addressing the issues of pluralistic ignorance.  The 
responsibility ought to be shared by legal counsel and the judiciary.  
At a minimum, judges need to examine critically any evidence 
presented of cultural practices and the relevance or generalizations 
that can be drawn from that evidence.  The greater burden, 
however, lies with the attorney representing a client whose 
expectations are likely to be dismissed as unreasonable and 
illegitimate because they are shaped or framed by a different 
culture.  Since culture is often invisible—consisting of beliefs that 
are perceived to be self-evident and incontestable—only the 
introduction of testimony or evidence about a competing worldview 
will serve to make culture visible as a “truth” that can be contested. 
I see no reference in the appellate brief submitted by Kim’s 
lawyer to any cultural information that might support his client’s 
claim.16  If cultural evidence had been introduced, the burden ought 
to have shifted to the judges to consider the reliability and the 
relevance of this information.  Cross-cultural or comparative 
analysis may seem straightforward, but it seldom is.17  A 
 
mores—the customs and mores that are themselves complex, variable 
with time and place, inconsistent and contradictory. 
1 ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1.1, at 2, 4 (rev. ed. 1993). 
 16. See Appellant’s Opening Brief, Kim v. Son, 2008 WL 39993686 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2008) (No. G039818). 
 17. An abject lesson in the use of anthropologists as experts would be the 
testimony by Burton Pasternak, a cultural anthropologist, in People v. Dong Lu 
Chen, No. 87-7774 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 2, 1988).  See Cynthia Lee, Cultural 
Convergence: Interest Convergence Theory Meets the Cultural Defense, 49 ARIZ. 
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sociocultural analysis at trial or on appeal would be easier if people 
understood what culture is, but even scholars use the term 
promiscuously, so that the concept has a fuzziness about it that 
makes it an awkward analytical tool.  Culture is best described as a 
“worldview,” a sense of the way things are and the way they should 
be, the way people should behave, and the social significance of the 
relationships between them.  Everything else is elaboration—the 
symbols we use, the myths we perpetuate, and the material culture 
we produce. 
The issues raised in the representation of members of culturally 
diverse communities are complex.  As one anthropologist explained 
it, when evidence of culture is introduced, there is a risk that this 
evidence will create or reinforce an “essentialist understanding of 
cultural communities as clearly bounded and internally 
homogeneous.”18  While anthropologists claim to “treat ambiguity 
and complexity as immanent aspects of all real life situations,” the 
methodology employed by most courts is “to prune away ‘extraneous’ 
details.”19  The risk inherent in this methodology is an essentialist 
representation, the “othering” of a cultural community and the 
particular litigant.20 
The relevance of culture is easy to see in a case where two 
Korean men bring their dispute into a U.S. court and the evidence 
adduced by the plaintiff is a contract signed in blood.  We are 
surprised by the practice, if practice it is, of recording a promise in 
blood, but not because blood oaths are unknown to us.  There is a 
practice that is commonplace in American culture, a way people 
create fictive fraternal relationships with ritual behavior that 
involves a mixing of blood.21 
But these expressions of loyalty take place in private 
ceremonies that have nothing to do with commercial transactions.22  
And while much is made of the practice in Asia of business 
 
L. REV. 911, 941–42 (2007); Leti Volpp, (Mis)Identifying Culture: Asian Women 
and the “Cultural Defense,” 17 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 57, 65 (1994). 
 18. Anthony Good, Cultural Evidence in Courts of Law, 14 J. ROYAL 
ANTHROPOLOGICAL INST. S47, S52 (Supp. 2008). 
 19. Id. at S51. 
 20. The best example of the misuse of culture in lawyering and the 
“othering” of an immigrant is the much criticized case of People v. Dong Lu 
Chen, No. 87-7774 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 2, 1988).  See Lee, supra note 17; Volpp, 
supra note 17; Carwina Weng, Multicultural Lawyering: Teaching  Psychology 
to Develop Cultural Self-Awareness, 11 CLINICAL L. REV. 369, 388 (2005) 
(concluding that the testimony of the anthropologist offering evidence of 
Chinese culture “began and ended on the premise of an essentialized Chinese 
man, rooted in a culture completely foreign from American culture”). 
 21. See, e.g., Clifford Krauss, “Blood Oath” Sealed Stanford Deal, Court is 
Told, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 2009, at B1. 
 22. One exception might be the “blood brother” relationship that is alleged 
to exist between R. Allen Stanford, who was being prosecuted for his operation 
of a fraudulent Ponzi scheme, and his banker in Antigua, Leroy King.  Id. 
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transactions that are preceded by or negotiated in social settings 
that involve consumption of alcohol, such practices are not unknown 
in the United States either.  Whether it is the “three martini lunch,” 
the golf game followed by cocktails at the country club, or the 
baseball game at which huge quantities of beer are consumed, the 
use of alcohol to lubricate the wheels of commerce is not unknown in 
American culture.  After all, generations of law students have cut 
their conceptual teeth on a case involving two men who were “high 
as a Georgia Pine” when they wrote out a contract on a paper 
napkin and a court had no problem finding contractual intent in 
that case.23 
The difficulty in attempts to find cross-cultural similarities is 
the risk inherent in cultural translation, the temptation to find 
something analogous in both cultures and treat them as equivalents.  
Inappropriate cultural translation is not the problem in Kim v. Son.  
There are inferences drawn by the court that disregard Korean 
cultural practices Professor Kim documents in her article, 
specifically the conclusion that Son was “extremely intoxicated” 
when he promised to repay the money to Kim.24  On the other hand, 
the criticism implicit in the court’s legal conclusion—a meritless suit 
against a “friend” is not consideration—may represent some sort of 
cultural convergence.  In this case, the American tradition of 
condemning litigious behavior might produce the same result as a 
presumed preference for alternative dispute resolution in some 
Asian countries.25 
Professor Kim is cognizant of the risk of essentialism and 
othering effect of the blood contract; she is worried that its “freakish, 
exotic quality” might have distracted the judges in the case from an 
examination of the aspects of Korean culture more relevant to the 
dispute.26  She is careful to point out the deliberation with which the 
parties created two versions, the one written in pen and ink and the 
other written in blood, but she also includes some discussion of 
scholarship that characterizes Korean culture as one in which honor 
and shame matter.27 
She does not speculate about Korean culture or engage in 
inappropriate “translations.”  Instead she provides insight into 
Korean culture using documentary sources.  Professor Kim cites to a 
U.S. Department of Commerce publication, Korean and U.S. news 
articles, American scholarly materials about Asian and U.S. 
conceptions of contract, including the absence of doctrines like 
 
 23. Lucy v. Zehmer, 84 S.E.2d 516, 519, 522 (Va. 1954). 
 24. Kim v. Son, No. G039818, 2009 WL 597232, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 9, 
2009). 
 25. See generally the discussion of cultural convergence in Lee, supra note 
17. 
 26. Kim, supra note 1, at 658–59. 
 27. Id. 
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consideration or rules like the statute of frauds.28  The issue most 
germane to the question of volitional intent in Kim v. Son would be 
the article claiming that Koreans do not recognize consideration as a 
requirement for the formation of a contract. 
III.  THE MISSING LINK: CULTURE, CONSIDERATION, AND THE 
CORPORATE PERSON 
The outcome in Kim v. Son is not simply a function of pluralistic 
ignorance or lack of cultural competence.  That deficiency might 
have been cured by a test for intent that considered the social 
identity of the parties and the cultural context in which the 
transaction took place.  The problem in Kim v. Son cannot be 
addressed by an intent test because, to use Lon Fuller’s dichotomy, 
the issue is not consideration as “form” but consideration as 
“substance.”29  The doctrine of consideration is sometimes explained 
or justified in terms of its function, which is why Professor Kim 
discusses the cautionary, channeling, and evidentiary effects of the 
writing in this case.30  But a situated reasonableness test or a 
volitional intent test in the United States cannot save a transaction 
memorialized in writing by the parties even if the writing serves the 
evidentiary and cautionary functions.  Kim v. Son is a case in which 
the court gives notice to the parties that form must be satisfied; 
consideration doctrine performs a categorical function, sorting legal 
from nonlegal transactions.31 
Courts have not adopted a standard that looks exclusively at 
the actual intent of the parties.  With the exception of the UCC 
where consideration is no longer required for options or 
modifications,32 the efforts to remedy the injustices that arise from 
the strict application of the consideration doctrine have led to the 
creation of very specific exceptions.  Promissory estoppel and 
promise for a past benefit are offered as alternatives to 
consideration.  The naming and categorization of these exceptions 
may actually have impeded a more fluid approach, one which relies 
on a less structured examination of reasonable expectations.  The 
quotation from Fuller Professor Kim cites is promising, but I can 
think of no “forces native to the situation,” especially the “habits and 
conceptions of the transacting parties” that currently render 
“superfluous” formality in the guise of the consideration doctrine.33 
The exceptions that have been created, promise for a past 
benefit and promissory estoppel, are inapplicable in Kim v. Son 
 
 28. Id. at 654–58. 
 29. Fuller, supra note 11, at 799–800. 
 30. Kim, supra note 1, at 648–49. 
 31. Fuller, supra note 11, at 803. 
 32. See U.C.C. §§ 2-205, 2-209 (2010). 
 33. Fuller, supra note 11, at 805. 
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because of a juridical fidelity to the legal fiction that a corporation is 
a person.  In the eyes of the California courts, Son did not receive a 
benefit before or after he made the promise because Kim loaned 
money to and invested money in corporate entities.  The court uses a 
straight doctrinal approach, applying the consideration doctrine to 
make the promises unenforceable.  The real impediment to 
enforcement in this case is the existence of two corporations, one in 
Korea and one in the United States.  No one, not the court or the 
lawyers, had much to say about the operation of these entities 
except to conclude that they were “valid corporations,” that the loans 
and investments went to the corporations and that there was “no 
evidence that . . . Son received any of the money.”34 
Both of the exceptions to the consideration doctrine are thus 
made inapposite.  A promise for a past benefit is a doctrine that 
every law student learns in law school.  In California, it is statutory 
as well as a matter of common law.35  Mills v. Wyman, the canonical 
case instructing law students on the difference between moral 
obligation and legal obligation, acknowledged that a subsequent 
promise to perform a contract that had become unenforceable 
because of some “legal impediment” could be enforced by the 
promisee.36  Kim never had a contract with Son; nor did he confer a 
benefit on Son—unless, of course, investing at his behest in one 
corporation and loaning money to the other is considered a benefit.  
The court did not think so.  Like Wyman, the dishonorable father in 
Mills v. Wyman who had no legal obligation to pay for a benefit his 
son received after he came of age even though the father promised to 
do so, Son had no obligation to pay for a benefit received by his 
wholly owned corporation. 
The only way Son could be responsible for the money he asked 
Kim to invest or loan to his companies and that he promised to 
repay would be if he personally guaranteed these debts.  Case law in 
California precludes this as a possibility.  A third party cannot 
guarantee repayment for a loan already advanced unless there is 
separate consideration for that guarantee.37  If Kim had threatened 
to sue the corporations, Son’s promise to pay the debt might have 
 
 34. Kim v. Son, No. G039818, 2009 WL 597232, *2–3 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 9, 
2009). 
 35. Cal. Civ. Code § 1606 (West 2008) (“An existing legal obligation resting 
upon the promisor, or a moral obligation originating in some benefit conferred 
upon the promisor, or prejudice suffered by the promisee, is also a good 
consideration for a promise, to an extent corresponding with the extent of the 
obligation, but no further or otherwise.”). 
 36. 20 Mass. (3 Pick.) 207, 209 (1825). 
 37. Cal. Civ. Code § 2792 (West 2008) (“Where a suretyship obligation is 
entered into at the same time with the original obligation, or with the 
acceptance of the latter by the creditor, and forms with that obligation a part of 
the consideration to him, no other consideration need exist.  In all other cases 
there must be a consideration distinct from that of the original obligation.”). 
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been supported by consideration.  But the attorney did not allege a 
threat to sue the corporations.  The pleadings alleged Kim’s 
forbearance in suing Son.  The court concluded that forbearance to 
sue on a meritless claim was not consideration. 
In the United States, a written promise may serve an 
evidentiary function, but it is not sufficient to establish liability 
without a bargain—a past benefit or reliance.  The use of ritual, 
resorting to symbols intended to signal intent to be legally bound, 
are ineffective.  A ritual act, even if it is used frequently in another 
culture, is unlikely to subvert the fidelity of U.S. courts to 
established contract doctrines or to the fictive corporate person.  
Still, if I were making an argument about reasonable expectations, 
the aspect of Korean culture that I might explore would be the 
relative permeability of the corporate form.  The doctrine of piercing 
the corporate veil exists in Korea just as it does in the United 
States.38  What I would like to know is not whether Korea has a 
shaming culture, but whether Korean businessmen and the legal 
system in Korea expect that they, as the owners of closely held 
corporations, can create for themselves a binding obligation to pay 
the debt of the corporation. 
 
 
 38. See generally Young-Cheol David K. Jeong, Comments on Piercing 
Corporate Veil Cases at Korean Courts (Korean) (June 1, 2009) (Working 
Paper), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1662862 (stating that Korean 
courts have accepted the theory of piercing the corporate veil). 
